The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) has completed 45 years and a new draft agreement is under negotiation. The basic factor which needs to be highlighted while reviewing the working of ATTA is that it was essentially a political document. Having a hostile neighbour in the east, President Ayub felt it essential to avoid having a hostile neighbour in the West. This was not that easy as it sounds, since the Afghans in those days, particularly under Prince Daud, were intent on exacerbating the Pashtunistan issue.
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ATTA was, therefore, used as a political tool and concessions were provided to the Afghans in excess of our commitments under the international conventions on the rights of land locked states. At the same time, whenever political pressure by the Afghans on Pashtunistan became unbearable, transit trade was always a casualty, at times even being suspended, to ensure responsible and reasonable behaviour by the Afghan government.
This strategy worked quite well as President Ayub developed a rapport with King Zahir Shah and managed to convince him of the costs following Prince Daud’s extremist policies. The result was a quiet western border during our wars with India. Prime Minister Bhutto also used to personally calibrate the workings of ATTA as one of the levers for controlling President Daud’s excesses.
Furthermore, ATTA also had a considerable effect on FATA. While the focus was on Pak-Afghan relations it was obvious during the negotiations that most of the items the Afghans imported duty free would ultimately be smuggled back into Pakistan. This was considered an acceptable price to pay, particularly since the major beneficiaries of this practice would be the tribes of FATA who were the target of Afghan irredentism. ATTA was, therefore, used as a tool to win over the pro-Afghan Maliks and strengthen the pro-Pakistan Maliks, and again this strategy worked reasonable well. In practice our customs FC and PA’s also took their share of the largesse which inadvertently also helped in oiling the wheels of the administration in the region and building up ties with the tribes.
Until recently this policy worked quite well in maintaining relations with Afghanistan on an even keel and as a means of supplementing the incomes of the impoverished tribesmen. However, as the new century dawned, this political focus was lost and ATTA became a victim of competing bureaucracies, each of whom had valid economic arguments but were limited by their tunnel vision based on their areas of individual expertise. Consequently, they failed to view the agreement through the entire spectrum of bilateral relations with Afghanistan and FATA. This is something which comes naturally in the Foreign Office, as it is the only agency of the government tasked with providing a worldview. The diminution of Foreign Office responsibilities by the end of President Zia’s rule also spelled the end of this worldview as applied to ATTA.
The first step in this direction was taken by CBR when it unilaterally decided, contrary to the provisions of ATTA and the international conventions, that 24 items being smuggled back into Pakistan should be put on a negative list and excluded altogether from the import facility. The Afghan traders went to court and obtained a Supreme Court judgement in their favour, which left CBR completely indifferent; an example of the extent of the powers of the various tiers of the administration. Hopefully, this has changed now with a revitalised Supreme Court.
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